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4 tHE ParEto law aND tHE DIstrIButIoN  
of laBour INcomE IN Italy *
This chapter provides an empirical examination of the distribution of labour earnings 
in Italy. Using data drawn from the 2005 and 2006 waves of the PLUS (See chapter 
9) to analyzed the shape of the observed distributions to be right-skewed and display 
a long right tail, which is adequately described by a Pareto-type model. This chapter 
also address the question of earnings dispersion by applying a nested decomposition 
procedure of the Theil inequality measure, which combines into a unified framework 
the standard decompositions by population subgroups and income sources. The empiri-
cal evidence obtained points to the key role played by the self-employees in shaping 
labour income inequality, especially at the upper extreme of the earnings distribution, 
and the emergence of non-standard forms of employment as an important feature of 
the contemporary workplace. The structure of the chapter is: after a brief introduc-
tion, data and methodological decisions are discussed; then it presents the empirical 
results obtained in the above analysis; finally, some concluding remarks and policy 
implications are drawn.
4.1 Introduction1
Theories of labour earnings distributions have always had strong empirical motivations. 
The earliest empirical studies of earnings distribution (e.g. Lydall, 1968, and Harrison, 
1981) discovered remarkable regularities that are found in all observed distributions in 
large populations. In particular, earnings distributions (and income distributions more 
generally) tend to be skewed to the right and display long right tails. Furthermore, mean 
earnings generally exceed median ones, and the top percentiles of their distribution 
account for a significant share of the total.
* Fabio Clementi and Michele Giammatteo.
1. We acknowledge the Italian Institute for the Development of Vocational Training for Workers (ISFOL) for 
providing us with data from the 2005 and 2006 waves of the Participation Labour Unemployment Survey (PLUS). 
Microdata use authorization code ISFOL PLUS 2006/428. The PLUS data are available at no cost by sending a 
request e-mail to plus@isfol.it. Usual disclaimer applies.
120 4 The Pareto Law and the Distribution  of Labour Income in Italy
The assembly and empirical analysis of data on personal incomes were pioneered by 
Pareto (1897), who apparently was responsible for the first attempt at defining a general 
“law” that tried to explain the regularities of observed distributions. Let  
be the complementary cumulative distribution of  denoting the percentage of indi-
viduals with incomes greater than or equal to . Then, the (strong) Pareto law asserts that
(1)   
 being the minimum possible value of .
Later, extensive development of microeconomic data sources led to a more compre-
hensive treatment of the subject. Indeed, available empirical work leaves little doubt 
that the Pareto law, as it stands, does not account satisfactorily for a wide range of 
incomes. Subsequently, the use of other density functions to model the income dis-
tribution, such as the lognormal (Aitchison and Brown, 1954, 1957) or gamma (Salem 
and Mount, 1974), has been advocated. However, rapidly accruing evidence showed 
that the lognormal and gamma distributions fit the data relatively well in the middle 
range of income, but tend to exaggerate the skewness and perform poorly in the upper 
end (McDonald and Ransom, 1979; McDonald, 1984). Furthermore, if one’s attention 
is restricted to the upper tail of the distributions, the evidence does not contradict the 
Pareto law, provided that the chosen  is large enough. This suggests that observed 
distributions obey a weak version of the Pareto law (Mandelbrot, 1960), e.g.
(2) 
and some well-known density functions that have been proposed and implemented in 
the literature asymptotically approach (rather than coincide with) the Pareto distribu-
tion. Among these, the Singh-Maddala (1976) and Dagum (1977) distributions have 
shown them to be a good compromise between parsimony and goodness-of-fit in 
many instances.
This chapter tackles the issue of the shape of the labour earnings distribution in Italy. 
Using data drawn from the 2005 and 2006 waves of the Participation Labour Unemploy-
ment Survey (PLUS), a sample survey on the Italian labour market supply carried out 
by ISFOL2, we find that the Italian labour income distribution in any one year is highly 
2. The Italian Institute for the Development of Vocational Training for Workers (ISFOL) is a research institute 
connected to the Italian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and member of the Italian National Statistical 
1214 The Pareto Law and the Distribution  of Labour Income in Italy
skewed to the right, with an upper tail very well described by the Pareto distribution3. 
In particular, the pattern noted in the analysis of the top of the distribution reveals that 
inequality amongst the rich decreased between 2005 and 2006, with the Pareto coef-
ficient rising from 1.96 to 2.22. This finding adds support to the story told by summary 
inequality indices that document a slight decline in overall inequality from one year to 
the other, and reveals the effect of the shape of earnings distribution on the inequal-
ity of labour market outcomes. Therefore, in order to understand the detail behind 
this change, we also consider how much of the dispersion in earnings concentrated 
in different parts of the distribution might be accounted for by alternative sources of 
labour income. To this end, a nested decomposition of the Theil inequality measure by 
population subgroups and income sources is performed as proposed by Giammatteo 
(2007), and the results seem to corroborate recent findings pointing to a deterioration 
in the Italian labour market situation due to the widening gap between the incomes of 
employees and self-employees and the increased job precariousness4. Indeed, in both 
the years examined we observe a significant positive contribution to the between-
group component of inequality arising from self-employment income, which results 
to be more highly concentrated (and thus responsible for the inequality level) in the 
upper end of the distribution, as opposed to the inequality-decreasing effect in terms 
of between-group differences exerted by income from standard employment, which 
instead appears more concentrated in the bulk. Earnings from atypical employment, in 
turn, have seen their share of both the total population and income increases from one 
year to the other, thus arising as an important feature of the contemporary workplace.
The rest of this work is organized as follows: Section 4.2 describes the data used in the 
study and outlines the approach to estimating the upper tail of the observed distri-
butions and the implied amount of inequality. Section 4.3 presents the results of the 
analysis. Section 4.4 summarizes the main results and draws some implications for policy.
System (SISTAN). The PLUS survey is included in the Italian National Statistical Programme (NSP), the SISTAN tool 
for planning statistical activity of public interest. For a collection of various research results on the Italian labour 
market conducted by ISFOL using this dataset, see Mandrone and Radicchia (2006).
3. There exists a number of earlier theories that are directly relevant to the functional description of the upper 
tail of earnings distribution through the Pareto model. One such set of theories is that dealing with executive 
remuneration in a hierarchical structure (Simon, 1957; Lydall, 1959). For a comprehensive review of the main 
theoretical approaches addressing the stylized facts of the distribution of earnings, see e.g. Neal and Rosen (2000).
4. As far as the impact of the increase in precarious employment on the Italian labour market distributional 
outcomes is concerned, Boeri and Brandolini (2004) claim that «here the reasoning is tentative». Indeed, despite 
the trend increase in non-standard forms of employment and its influence on rising earnings inequality have 
been acknowledged from a number of points of view, there has until now been only limited empirical evidence 
on the subject (see e.g. Sciulli, 2006, and Lucidi and Raitano, 2009). In this respect, Rani (2008), when looking at 
how changing employment patterns might explain the rise in inequality observed in the majority of countries 
over the past two decades, recognizes that «it is difficult to empirically establish the relationship between widen-
ing inequality and wage differentials between standard and non-standard work due to lack of data». The special 
emphasis given in the PLUS survey to the investigation of atypical contracts could play a major role in filling this 
gap, at least for the case of Italy.
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4.2 Data and Methodology
The analysis of the distribution of labour earnings in Italy is based on data obtained from 
the PLUS. The database is described in Chapter 9 Complementary to other key national 
statistical sources5, the core objective of the PLUS is that of providing reliable estimates 
of rare and only marginally explored labour market issues, such as the distribution of 
contract types (employee/self-employed status and their articulated subclassifications), 
job search activity, young and women employment participation, old-age activity and 
retirement choice, pattern of education and other training, intergenerational dynamics, 
etc. Therefore, despite its limited time span, this dataset may be useful to pin down 
the role that alternative sources of labour earnings play as determinants of income 
distribution and inequality among workers, particularly for the special emphasis given 
to the investigation of atypical contracts.
The income concept used is the monthly “gross income” normalized on annual basis 
earned by workers classified according to the following categories: standard full-time 
workers with open-ended contracts, self-employed and atypical workers - this latter 
category including workers with fixed-term contracts and other non-standard jobs. 
This variable is in current year euros (€), and we use the consumer price index for the 
whole nation (NIC) based on the year 1995 in order to obtain distributions of “real” 
income6. Furthermore, because of the complex sampling design of the PLUS survey, 
data make use throughout the analysis of appropriate sampling weights to produce 
representative estimates and correct standard errors and statistical tests7. A set of basic 
statistics calculated from these data is given in Table 4.1.
5. In Italy, information on labour market characteristics can be obtained from various sources. Two prominent 
examples are the Labour Force Survey (LFS, http://www.istat.it/en/archive/36394), conducted quarterly by the 
National Institute for Statistics (ISTAT), and the Work Histories Italian Panel (WHIP, http://www.laboratoriorevelli.it/
whip/whip_datahouse.php?lingua=eng&pagina=home), built from a sample of microdata from the administrative 
archives of the National Institute of Social Security (INPS). However, while the former considers the household as 
sampling unit, the latter includes microdata on private sector employees only.
6. The series of the NIC index is publicly available on the website of the Italian National Statistical Institute 
(ISTAT) at the address http://www.istat.it/prezzi/precon/dati/ indici_nazionali_1_nic.xls.
7. The expansion weights coming with the PLUS survey are calibrated using GREG estimation (Deville and Särndal, 
1992), which guarantees reduction of sample selection bias, small estimation variance, and large consistency with 
the standard labour market indicators derivable from the Italian Labour Force Survey (RCFL) conducted by ISTAT.
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Table 4.1 - Sample statistics, 2005 and 2006
Wave Statistics Gross inc. Standard
Self-
employed 
Atypical
2005
Obs 15,868 10,777 2,506 2,585 
Pop. (‘000) 21,570 13,975 4,816 2,779 
Min 472 1,727 472 944 
p25 11,802 12,619 9,441 7,553 
Med. 14,612 14,612 17,309 11,955 
p75 18,597 18,464 31,471 14,612 
Max 236,035 158,585 236,035 141,621 
Mean 17,967 16,118 26,626 12,258 
St. dev. 16,786 7,981 30,595 8,071 
Skewness 5.97 5.38 3.29 4.00 
Kurtosis 55.87 65.35 17.58 37.17 
2006
Obs 16,475 10,185 2,380 3,910 
Pop. (‘000) 22,619 14,254 4,282 4,083 
Min 231 715 231 715 
p25 11,094 13,087 9,245 6,504 
Med. 14,458 15,144 16,949 11,094 
p75 18,574 18,574 30,817 13,867 
Max 288,906 184,413 288,906 96,559 
Mean 17,182 16,295 25,719 11,328 
St. dev. 15,195 8,150 28,899 7,630 
Skewness 6.87 6.09 3.91 4.26 
Kurtosis 82.81 83.83 26.45 39.47 
Source: authors’own calculations using the PLUS 2005 and 2006 data
As we have said, it is normally the case that income data, if they follow the Pareto law 
(1) at all, do so only for values of  above some lower bound . Therefore, before 
calculating the estimate of the shape parameter , we need first to discard all observa-
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tions below this point so that we are left with only those for which the Pareto model is 
a valid one. Perhaps the most common way of estimating parameters for the classical 
Pareto distribution is to choose visually the point  beyond which the empirical com-
plementary cumulative distribution of the data becomes roughly straight on a doubly 
logarithmic plot and extract the magnitude of  by least-squares linear regression8.
Unfortunately, this method and other variations on the same theme, by imposing an 
arbitrary threshold above which the Pareto relationship is valid, generate significant 
systematic errors under relatively common conditions and the results they give can not 
be trusted (Aigner and Goldberger, 1970; Weron, 2001; Goldstein et. al., 2004; Sornette, 
2004; Brizio and Montoya, 2005; Clauset et. al., 2007). Therefore, more accurate and 
robust approaches are desirable. Among these, the maximum likelihood estimator  
of introduced by Hill (1975) - which is known to be asymptotically normal (e.g. Hall, 
1982) and consistent (Mason, 1982) - does not assume a parametric form for the entire 
distribution function, but focuses only on the tail behaviour.
That is, if  are the sample elements put in descending 
order, then the Hill estimator for  based on the  largest sample values is
(3) 
where  is the sample size and  is the rank of the order statistic .
The Hill estimator is based on the assumption that  is known. In practice,  is unknown 
and needs to be estimated. The most common way to choose the value of  is to plot 
the estimates  against , yielding the so-called Hill plot, and look for a region where 
the plot levels off to identify the optimal number of observations in the upper tail to be 
used in the estimation of  (e.g. Beirlant et. al., 2004). However, the Hill plot typically 
is far from being constant, which makes it difficult to use the estimator  in practice 
without further guideline on how to choose the value . Moreover, the finite-sample 
properties of the Hill estimator depend crucially on the choice of , or, equivalently, 
the estimate of the lower bound on Pareto behaviour : indeed, if we choose too 
low a value for  we will get a biased estimate of the shape parameter, since we 
will be attempting to fit a Pareto model to non-Pareto data; on the other hand, if we 
choose too high a value for  we are effectively throwing away legitimate data points 
, which increases both the statistical error on the shape parameter and the bias 
from finite size effects. Thus, if we wish our estimate of to be accurate, we also need 
an accurate method for estimating .
8. For a considerable in-depth discussion on this and other inference procedures for the classical Pareto dis-
tribution see e.g. Arnold (1983), Johnson et. al. (1994), Quandt (1966) and Kleiber and Kotz (2003).
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Here we adopt a numerical technique for selecting  proposed by Clauset et al. 
(2007b) that is based on minimizing the “distance” between the Pareto model and the 
empirical data. The fundamental idea behind this method is simple: we choose the 
estimate of  that makes the probability distributions of the measured data and the 
best-fit Pareto model as similar as possible above . Specifically, for each  we first 
obtain by using  the estimate  of the shape parameter over the data , and 
then compute the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) goodness-of-fit statistic
(4) 
between the empirical cumulative distribution of the data points being fit, , and 
the theoretical Pareto cumulative distribution function with parameters  and 
, e.g. . Our optimal estimate of the lower bound, , is then the value of 
 where  attains its minimum, from which we infer the optimal sample fraction, 
, and the optimal estimate of the shape parameter, . Once the parameters have 
been estimated, by exploiting the asymptotic distribution theory of the Hill estimator 
we calculate the standard error of the shape parameter as  (e.g. Lux, 1996), 
whereas the uncertainty in the estimate  for is derived by making use of a nonparame-
tric bootstrap method (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). That is, given our  measurements, we 
generate a synthetic dataset by drawing a new sequence of points, , uniformly 
at random from the original data. Using the method described above, we then estimate 
 for this surrogate dataset. By taking the standard deviation of all the estimates over 
a large number of repetitions of this process, we can quantify our uncertainty in the 
original estimated parameter.
Finally, we also perform a K-S goodness-of-fit test of the Pareto distribution for the 
observations above  by generating a p-value that quantifies the plausibility of the 
hypothesized model9. In detail, our procedure is as follows. First, we fit our empirical 
data to the Pareto model using the method described above and calculate the K-S 
statistic  for this fit. Next, we generate a large number of synthetic datasets having  
observations randomly drawn from a Pareto distribution with shape parameter  and 
lower bound  equal to those of the distribution that best fits the observed data. We 
9. One of the features of the K-S statistic is that its distribution is known for datasets truly drawn from any 
given distribution. This allows one to write down an explicit expression in the limit of large for the p-value. Un-
fortunately, this expression is only correct so long as the underlying distribution is fixed (see e.g. Stephens, 1986). 
If, as in our case, the underlying distribution is itself determined by fitting to the data and hence varies from one 
dataset to the next, we can not use this approach, which is why the Monte Carlo procedure described here is 
instead recommended.
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fit each synthetic dataset individually to the Pareto distribution and calculate the K-S 
statistic for each one relative to its own model10. Then we simply count what fraction 
of the time the resulting statistic is larger than the value for the empirical data. This 
fraction is the p-value for the fit, and can be interpreted in the standard way: if it is 
larger than the chosen significance level, then the difference between the empirical 
data and the model can be attributed to statistical fluctuations alone; if it is smaller, 
the model is not a plausible fit to the data.
With regard to the inequality analysis, the methodology we follow here is based on a 
nested procedure of decomposition of the Theil (1967) index (Giammatteo, 2007) that 
combines into a simultaneous approach the standard decompositions by population 
subgroups (which separates total inequality in within- and between-group compo-
nents) and income sources (which divides overall inequality into proportional factor 
contributions).
Despite the Gini-based multidecomposition of inequality proposed by Mussard (2004), 
the choice of the Theil index as the reference measure of inequality is motivated by 
two main reasons: i) it allows perfect (subgroups) decomposability11 and ii) satisfies the 
fundamental property of uniform addition for source-based decomposition12. A third, 
not trivial, advantage is given by its simple and very “smart” structure. More precisely, 
it is derivable as a linear function of three basic elements: (pseudo-)Theil sub indices 
of inequality (for groups and income sources), population shares and income shares. In 
other words, it allows to separate “size” and “spread” determinants of inequality both 
at the subgroup and income source level through the explicit reference to aggregates 
with political and economic relevance.
As shown in Giammatteo (2007), we can enclose into a unified framework the standard 
subpopulation and income source decompositions by deriving the following (weighted) 
bidimensional formulation of the Theil index.
10. Note crucially that for each synthetic dataset we compute the K-S statistic relative to the best-fit Pareto 
model for that dataset, not relative to the original distribution from which the dataset was drawn. In this way we 
ensure that we are performing for each synthetic dataset the same calculation that we performed for the real 
dataset, a crucial requirement if we wish to get an unbiased estimate of the p-value.
11. See e.g. Cowell (1980a,b) and Shorrocks (1984).
12. Following Morduch and Sicular (2002), a rule of factor decomposition satisfies the property of uniform addi-
tion if it registers strictly negative contributions to overall inequality for any income component equally distributed 
and positive. In this regard, Podder (1993) claims that «it is reasonable to think the addition of a constant to all 
incomes leading to a reduction in inequality if we accept relative measures». See also Shorrocks (1982, 1983) and 
Paul (2004) on this issue.
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(5) 
where  represents the individual weight13,  is the sum of the sample weights  
( ) for group , while, , and  are, respectively, the weighted 
means for the total,  subgroup and source of the  subgroup distribu-
tions14. Expression (5) implicitly defines the pseudo-Theil of the  istribution,
, e.g. the absolute contribution to total inequality of the 
component . It is important to observe that  does not measure the  source 
inequality15, as incomes in total and partial distributions have different ranks and 
the weights are those corresponding to the total distribution. Note also that while 
the global index  is always positive, the generic absolute contribution  
can assume both positive and negative values. Hereafter, we shall use the expres-
sion of inequality increasing (decreasing) sources for the income components 
showing positive (negative) values of . Similarly, we can define  as 
the generic  source contribution to between-group inequality (“between-group 
pseudo-Theil”) and  as the generic  source contribution to within-group 
inequality (“within-group pseudo-Theil”).
The bidimensional decomposition (5) provides a wider set of possible inequality de-
terminants than those that would be obtained by applying separated decompositions. 
In particular, we are able to distinguish among positive and negative sub effects on 
within- and between-group inequality components independently on the sign of the 
overall source contributions. More precisely:
standard subgroup decomposition provides aggregated within and between components 
of total inequality declining any information on additional source-based determinants;
13. The weights are proportional to the actual population of the strata from which the sample observations are 
drawn from. In the PLUS survey, strata are defined by region, type of city (metropolitan/not metropolitan), age (5 
classes), sex and employment status (employed, unemployed, student, retired, other inactive/housewife). A detailed 
description of the sampling design and strategy of the survey is contained in Giammatteo (2009).
14. Notice that when the not weighted formulation is adopted we simply have  and .
15. The  source inequality is, instead, given by .
128 4 The Pareto Law and the Distribution  of Labour Income in Italy
simple income source decompositions fail to distinguish in which way total income 
subcomponents affect total inequality through (equalising or not equalising) effects 
within subpopulations or between them.
The nested approach enforces both the subpopulation and income source decompo-
sitions, also representing a useful instrument for the analysis of the inequality con-
sequences of specific government policies (transfers or tax programs, labour market 
reforms, etc.)16.
4.3 Empirical Results
Using the data and methods described earlier, in this section we fit the classical Pareto 
model (1) to the upper tail of the Italian labour income distribution and analyze the 
extent to which the level of inequality in the tail and the whole of the distribution is 
affected by the earnings accruing to different workers.
The summary statistics in Table 4.1 suggest that the Pareto distributional assumption 
may be appropriate in our case. Indeed, there are two noticeable features. First is the 
positive skewness, which suggests that labour income distribution in any one year is 
highly skewed to the right. This can also be inferred by looking at the difference between 
median and mean income, the former being consistently lower than the latter in each 
year. Secondly, the level of kurtosis is well above the normal threshold both in 2005 
and 2006, hinting to the presence of a thick upper tail. Figure 4.1 reveals the extent of 
what suggested by Table 4.1. In the panels, the horizontal axis represents the log10 of 
the annual gross income reported in the PLUS survey and the vertical axis is the log10 
of the corresponding complementary cumulative probability. The signature feature of 
distributions that follow the Pareto law in the upper tail - e.g. the approximate linearity 
above some lower bound of the tail of their complementary cumulative distributions 
charted on a double logarithmic scale - is clearly evident by simple qualitative appraisal 
of the data.
16. Simpler but less precise approaches are given by: i) analyses of the relation between inequality and public 
policies through the use of dispersion graphs between inequality indices and country expenditures for social 
security (see e.g. Beblo and Knaus, 2001); ii) pre- and post-transfer inequality computations in order to assign 
factor contributions as relative difference between the two values (see e.g. Keane and Prasad, 2002, and Forster 
et al., 2003). As emphasized by Lerman (1999), the latter approach «may lead to misleading results».
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Figure 4.1 - Observed and predicted probabilities, 2005 and 2006
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Interestingly enough, this evidence is not accounted for by “super” models that obey the 
asymptotic Pareto law  - or one of the other versions proposed by Kakwani (1980) and 
Esteban (1986) and discussed e.g. in Krämer and Ziebach (2004). Indeed, the transition 
between the bulk of the distribution and the right tail is not smooth for the data shown 
in Figure 4.1, so such models would not be useful in our case. For example, McDonald 
(1984) introduced the generalized beta II distribution (GB2), a four-parameter distribu-
tion with density given by
where  is the beta function, which is not only very successful in fitting the data 
(Bordley et al., 1996), but also includes many of the models proposed to describe the 
size distribution of incomes.
Of these, the three-parameter Singh-Maddala (SM) and Dagum Type I (D) distributions, 
corresponding to the special cases
and
and the generalized gamma (GG) distribution, which is obtained by
have shown them to be a good compromise between parsimony and goodness-of-fit 
in many instances17. However, when fitted to both years of the data, these models fail 
to accommodate the empirical distribution at the upper extreme, as can be seen by 
visual inspection of Figure 4.1, where the observed probabilities are overlaid with those 
predicted by the fitted distributions (see Table 4.2)18. This suggests that a separate treat-
ment of the extreme tail of empirical distributions is in order, and we therefore apply 
the estimation method described in Section 2 to make a strong case for the Pareto 
17. The nested relationship of these distributions can be seen in greater detail in McDonald and Xu (1995).
18. The parameters have been estimated by using a nonlinear least-squares method as supplied by the R function 
nls (R Development Core Team, 2009). The results reported in Table 4.2 include the sum of squared errors (SSE), 
the sum of absolute errors (SAE), the negative log-likelihood value ( ), and the values of Akaike (1973) and 
Schwarz (1978) information criteria (AIC and BIC). All of these measures agree that the GB2 is the best model in 
both the years. According to a likelihood ratio test, its additional parameter provides a statistically significant (at 
the 0.1% level) improvement over its nested three-parameter distributions.
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hypothesis. The results from the fitting of a Pareto distribution to each of the years of 
data using the maximum-likelihood approach combined with the goodness-of-fit test 
based on the K-S statistic are shown in Figures 4.2 and 4.3.
Using this method, we obtain for the 2005 wave that the best possible fit for the largest values in 
the upper tail is attained for , where the minimum value of the K-S statistic 
is 0.06; the estimate of the shape parameter is  based on  the largest 
observations (about 21% of the sample). For the 2006 wave, the minimum value of the K-S statistic 
is found to be 0.07, yielding ; the estimated value of  
is, based on the  largest observations (about 20% of the sample).
The use of these estimates produces the fits shown by the solid lines in panels (c), where the 
complementary cumulative distributions of the empirical data are plotted on doubly logarithmic 
axes. A look at the Hill plots displayed in panels (b) suggests that these fits are a good match to 
the data, since beyond the chosen  the estimate  of the shape parameter appears roughly 
stable. Nonetheless, as a more objective indication of how plausible the Pareto model is as a fit 
to the tail data, we give in panels (a) the p-values for the K-S statistic, which as can be seen are 
large enough that the data can be firmly considered to follow the Pareto distribution in the upper 
tail. The linear behaviour emerging from the Pareto Q-Q plots of the sample quantiles above  
shown in panels (d) strongly supports the quantitative results obtained by hypothesis testing.
Having provided strong evidence for the presence of a Pareto tail in the Italian labour income 
distribution, we now turn to examining its role in shaping overall inequality. The situation is 
summarized in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, which are divided into four main parts: summary distribution 
statistics (namely, population and income share and relative mean), standard measures (Gini and 
Theil indices) of the amount of inequality in the income distribution, and standard as well as 
nested decomposition of the Theil index by population subgroups and type of income receivers.
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Figure 4.2 - Estimation of the Pareto upper tail, PLUS 2005
Notes: (a) Sequence of K-S values versus the rank of ordered sample values. The minimum value, 
, is attained for , corresponding to the optimal estimate of the scale parameter 
. The number in parentheses denotes the bootstrap p-value for the best-fit Pareto model 
based on 5000 resamples. (b) Hill estimate as a function of the n. of obs. in the upper tail. The dotted 
lines represent the 95% confidence limits around the point estimates given by , 
where  is the 95% point of the normal distribution.
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Notes: (c) Empirical (points) and Pareto (line) complementary cumulative distribution functions for 
the upper tail in log-log scale using the estimated optimal values for  and . The standard error 
on  (in parentheses) is derived from the asymptotic distribution theory of the Hill estimator and is 
given by, whereas the uncertainty in the estimate for  is derived by making use of a nonparametric 
bootstrap method based on 100 repetitions. (d) Q-Q plot for the observations above the estimated 
optimal threshold value using the transformation.
1354 The Pareto Law and the Distribution  of Labour Income in Italy
Figure 4.3 - Estimation of the Pareto upper tail, PLUS 2006
(a) K-S statistics for the best-fit Pareto model
(b) Hill plot
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(c) Best-fit Pareto model for the upper
(d) Q-Q plot for the upper tail
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As revealed by the first part of Table 4.3, in 2005 standard employees represented 
almost 65% of total population and received less than 60% of total income, while the 
self-employees made up about 22.3% of the whole population and their income share 
was nearly 1/3 of the total income; conversely, atypical workers accounted for 13% 
of the overall population and for 8.8% of total labour income. In 2006 (see the first 
part of Table 4.4) this pattern did not vary significantly, except for a not trivial increase 
(decrease) in the population and income share of atypical workers (self-employees), 
while a slight fall in the population share and a concurrent increase in the share of 
total income is observed for the group of standard employees. Looking at the relative 
means, the mean income from standard employment relative to that of the whole 
population was about 89.7% in 2005 against 94.8% in 2006; the corresponding yearly 
percentages were approximately 148.2% and 149.7% for self-employees, and 68.2% 
and 65.9% for atypical workers. Furthermore, by considering the subgroups made up of 
individuals with income  (group I) and  (group II), we observe that: i) in 2005 
the population share of group I was just over 80% and accounted for about 58% of 
the overall income amount, while in 2006 the corresponding shares were about 80.7% 
and 59.8%, respectively; ii) this evidence is reversed for group II, whose fractions of the 
overall population and income in 2005 were approximately 19.6% and 42.1%, while in 
2006 they amounted to about 19.3% and 40.2%; iii) the relative mean income of the 
two groups was respectively around 72.1% and 214.5% in 2005 against 74.2% and 
207.8% in 2006. Finally, for what concerns inequality, we computed an estimate of the 
Theil index of 0.249 in 2005 and 0.225 in 2006; the estimated Gini was, respectively, 
0.337 and 0.323. As can be depicted from the second part of the tables, in both the years 
the two measures showed sharp inequality heterogeneity at the population subgroup 
and income earner type levels. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to underline that either 
the ranks and changes of the inequality measured by the two indices exhibited strong 
consistency across the years, thus suggesting robustness of our findings.
The penultimate part of Tables 4.3 and 4.4 presents the results of the standard Theil 
decomposition by subgroups (I and II) of the population and type of income receiv-
ers. In the first case we observe that inequality in both the years was impulsed with 
almost the same intensity by the within- and the between-group components, which 
were estimated to be respectively 47.3% and 52.7% of overall inequality in 2005 and 
showed only very slight changes in 2006 (the corresponding estimates are 48.9% and 
51.1%). We also find a negative component of between-group inequality ascribable to 
group I (just over -76% in 2005 and below -80% in 2006) and a positive one to group 
II (around 130% on average in the two years), which also played a significant role in 
shaping within-group inequality (31.7% in 2005 and 30.7% in 2006). Looking at the 
decomposition results in terms of type of income receivers, the difference inside the 
subpopulations accounted for almost 87% of overall inequality in 2005 and 85% in 
2006, while the mean divergence between groups increased from 13.4% of the total 
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inequality in 2005 to 14.7% in 2006. Furthermore, in both the years the between-group 
component was negative for the incomes accruing to standard and atypical workers 
(decreasing for the former group and increasing for the latter from 2005 to 2006) and 
positive for self-employment income (around 51% on average in the two years), whereas 
the within-group component was mainly shaped by the distribution of labour income 
among standard and self-employed workers.
Finally, the results arising from applying the nested Theil decomposition procedure are 
displayed in the last part of Tables 4.3 and 4.4. As stated before (see Section 2), this 
method allows to discern the way in which every single component of labour income 
impacts on the within- and between-group inequalities (as estimated by partitioning of 
the population into groups I and II). We emphasize in this regard the following aspects.
i. The contribution to total inequality attributable to income from standard work 
was -4.4% in 2005, implying an inequality-reducing effect. This result arises as a 
combination of two opposite effects: a positive one on the within-group inequality 
(15.5%) and a negative one on the between-group component (-22.2%). Further-
more, income from standard work contributed positively to within differences when 
we look to the group I (42.2%) but negatively considering the group II (-26.7%). 
A similar result is also obtained in the between-group context, where we observe 
an inequality-decreasing (increasing) effect of -108.1% (86.0%) attributable to 
group I (II) afferents.
ii. Self-employment income represented the most important inequality-increasing 
source of income: its impact on total inequality amounted to 112% in 2005, with 
the two components of within- and between-group inequality contributing re-
spectively 92.4% and 129.6%, both markedly influenced by group II differences.
iii. Income stemming from atypical work made marked negative contributions of 
-7.6% in 2005 and -12.9% in 2006.
Moving to compare the nested Theil decomposition results over the two years, a so-
mewhat interesting empirical evidence seems to emerge. Firstly, in 2006 compared to 
the previous year income from standard work shifted from a negative to a positive 
contribution (9.8%) to overall inequality, in consequence of an increased weight of 
the within-group differences (23.0%) and a weaker inequality-decreasing effect of 
the between-group component (-2.8%). Secondly, with respect to the previous year 
income from self-employment, while preserving the sign, exerted effects of different 
magnitude on total inequality (103.1%, 89% and 116.5%), whereas income from atypical 
work reinforced its inequality-decreasing effect. The nested decomposition highlights 
that great part of this equalising overall effect seems to be justified by the low average 
incomes and their simultaneous high concentration among group I afferents. We also 
note that the negative between-group contribution to total inequality from atypical 
work changes from -7.5% to -13.8%, providing evidence of an increasing mean income 
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gap between this group of workers and the regular ones. Despite this, it is interesting 
to observe positive (and increasing) contributions to between-group inequality coming 
from atypical incomes concentrated in the upper tails of the two yearly distributions 
(10% in 2005 and 12% in 2006).
4.4 Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications
Our investigation of the shape of the Italian labour income distribution over the years 
2005 and 2006 gives added support to the “conventional wisdom” that earnings are 
highly skewed to the right with an upper tail that is suitably modeled by a Pareto dis-
tribution. The fitted Pareto functions of the upper tail reveal that inequality amongst 
the rich slightly decreased from one year to the other, and this appears to reflect in the 
pattern traced by standard inequality measures that show a reduction of a few percent 
in overall labour income inequality between 2005 and 2006.
In order to uncover the effect of the underlying earnings distribution shape on the 
inequality of labour market outcomes, we have performed a nested decomposition of the 
Theil inequality measure that emphasizes the twofold role played by sources of labour 
income and their distribution among the two groups of earners identified by splitting 
the samples in correspondence of the estimated lower quantiles above which the Pa-
reto distribution was fitted. The results indicate a negative contribution from standard 
employment income to overall inequality for the year 2005, which can be divided into 
an inequality-increasing effect exerted mainly within the group of earners in the bulk of 
the distribution and an inequality-decreasing effect in terms of between-group differ-
ences. The contribution from this source of labour income has switched from negative 
to positive in 2006, mainly because of the rise in relative mean - which has resulted in 
a weaker negative effect on the between-group component. As regards earnings from 
self-employment, they represent the most important inequality-increasing source of 
labour income in both the years of investigation, as a result of highest relative mean 
income and dispersion, especially at the upper extreme of the distributions. Finally, 
earnings arising from non-standard forms of employment have experimented from 
one year to the other an increase in both the population and income shares, as well as 
worsening relative mean and increasing source-specific inequality.
The policy implications of the current findings emerge quite naturally. The empirically 
documented Pareto distribution at high income levels implies rather high inequality. 
This possibly suggests more redistribution, considering that during the mid-2000s Italy 
achieved a modest redistribution from top to bottom of the income ladder (OECD, 
2008). However, any policy disregarding the diverse impact on inequality that standard 
employment, self-employment and atypical incomes have in different parts of the earn-
ings distribution would likely have only limited success in reducing overall inequality 
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through tax and transfer systems. Policy-makers should therefore avoid a uniform ap-
proach for all types of income and adopt a set of well-targeted policies properly taking 
into account these heterogeneities in terms of inequality.
